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It is not often that an Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) calls 
on the Court to clarify its position in view of the mounting questions coming from national courts. 
Yet this is what Advocate General Hogan did in his Opinion of 24 September 2020 in the BY case. He 
was referring to the Court’s 2016 Petruhhin ruling, that an EU country which is requested by a non-
EU country to extradite a national of another EU Member State must first ask that Member State if 
it wishes to prosecute its own national rather than fulfil the extradition request. “It is its own 
measure of the novelty of the solution proposed in Petruhhin that that decision does not perhaps 
appear to have enjoyed universal acceptance on the part of the Member States”. This Briefing 
explains what lies behind this comment and considers the perspectives for this controversial 
judgment. 
 
The new dicta of Petruhhin 
Petruhhin, an Estonian national, had long been on Interpol’s radar for large-scale drug trafficking. The 
Russian authorities eventually issued an extradition request against him and asked him to be placed 
in custody. Petruhhin was arrested in Latvia, where the course of the case took a significantly different 
turn. According to the Latvian Constitution, Latvian citizens may not be extradited to a foreign country, 
i.e. outside the EU, unless a specific international agreement allows so. In the case at hand there was 
a bilateral agreement between Latvia and Russia on judicial assistance which explicitly excluded the 
extradition of the nationals of the contracting parties. There was no similar bilateral agreement 
between Estonia and Russia. In these circumstances the Latvian courts, in reviewing the decision of 
the prosecutor granting the extradition, referred the matter to the CJEU, asking if Petruhhin, as an EU 
citizen living in Latvia, should benefit from the same protection from being extradited as enjoyed by 
Latvian nationals. 
The Court constructed the issue by placing EU citizenship at the centre of its analysis and reviewed 
the extradition rules applicable in Latvia from this premise. The Court found that two aspects of EU 
citizenship were affected, namely non-discrimination based on nationality and freedom of movement. 
It concluded that the rules not only treated Latvian and other EU nationals differently for extradition 
purposes, but were themselves liable to hinder free movement. The Court accepted that the 
prevention of the risk of impunity which animates extradition is a legitimate objective when justifying 
the limitation of rights stemming from EU citizenship. However, it concluded that the same objective 
could be attained by less restrictive measures. It was therefore natural to look to the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW), which has less of an impact on the exercise of EU citizenship rights while being equally 
effective in preventing the risk of impunity for a person alleged to have committed a criminal offence. 
Having found how best to preserve EU citizenship rights and the interests of criminal justice at the 
same time, the Court put forward its new dicta. According to this, when an EU country is requested 
by a third country with which it has an extradition agreement to extradite a national of another EU 
country (the ‘home Member State’), the requested country (the ‘host Member State’) should first 





inform the home Member State that it has received an extradition request for its national from a third 
country instead of proceeding with the extradition. On this basis the home Member State may decide 
to request the surrender of its own national under an EAW provided that it has jurisdiction to 
prosecute its own nationals for crimes committed abroad.   
 
Petruhhin in practice 
One of the intriguing aspects of the Petruhhin judgment is how this new dicta shapes the granting of 
international extradition requests received by an EU Member State. Extradition between an EU 
Member State and a third country takes place on the basis of either (1) reciprocity or a bilateral 
agreement, (2) the 1957 European Extradition Convention concluded under the auspices of the 
Council of Europe, or (3) an agreement concluded by the EU itself (with USA, Japan, Norway, Iceland). 
Petruhhin affected the first category (bilateral extradition agreements) which the CJEU, despite their 
origin in international law, clearly pulled under EU law. The judgment was, before long, extended to 
the extradition agreements concluded by the EU (in relation to the EU-US extradition agreement see 
Pisciotti, re the Norway Iceland Agreement see Ruska Federacija). Subsequently, extradition requests 
made not to prosecute but to enforce a custodial sentence, were also found to give way to an eventual 
EAW from the home Member State (Raugevicius).  
The practical implications of the obligation imposed on both countries concerned cannot be 
underestimated.  The requested Member State must now immediately inform the home Member 
State that its national was requested in the context of an international extradition, to allow for the 
possibility that the home Member State may want to prosecute that person itself, provided it has 
jurisdiction to do so. However, that jurisdiction cannot be taken for granted, as states have different 
views on whether to extend their jurisdiction to offences committed by their own nationals abroad. 
For the purposes of issuing an EAW to prosecute in the home Member State, it is far from certain that 
the information contained in the third country’s extradition request is sufficient to bring a charge, let 
alone to prosecute successfully. If more information is required, from whom will the home Member 
State obtain it? If it is the requesting third country, what happens if there are no underlying legal 
arrangements between that country and the home Member State to share this information, as was 
the case in Petruhhin itself? If the home Member State cannot directly contact the requesting third 
country, it must rely on the host Member State.  
But then, what is the role of the host Member State in securing information for the home Member 
State? Should it request supplementary information from the third country? Can the information so 
acquired be transmitted directly to the home Member State or is the consent of the third country 
needed?  
More generally, what is the timeline for the home Member State to take a decision on whether it 
wants to prosecute; and for how long can the requested host Member State keep the requested 
person in detention while it awaits that decision, knowing that there must be an ultimate time limit 
for detention?  
And to what extent is the obligation of the requested Member State to inform the host Member State 
affected if the EU citizen concerned is already established in that Member State and his/her centre of 
interest now lies there? In such situations should the requested Member State itself take over the 
prosecution if its national law so permits?  






Perspectives after Petruhhin 
These uncertainties are not merely of practical relevance. Two fundamental premises of international 
extradition are affected. The first is the objective of preventing the risk of impunity in criminal 
proceedings. Despite the fact that the CJEU itself recognised this objective, all the practical 
implications of the Petruhhin dicta seem to work against it. The home Member State of which the 
requested person is a national may seem to be the preferred venue for prosecution (or for the 
execution of a custodial sentence) from the viewpoint of EU citizenship but this is certainly not the 
case from the viewpoint of the criminal justice system. The time, effort and logistics needed to acquire 
information for a home Member State prosecution could potentially weaken the case for the 
prosecution and therefore put at risk the objective of preventing impunity. 
The second issue at stake here relates to the very origin of extradition, which is a treaty obligation. 
The Petruhhin dicta stems from the CJEU’s interpretation, which is authoritative for EU Member 
States, but also directly affects international treaty obligations. Requiring the requested Member 
State to give precedence to the EAW issued by the home EU Member State over its obligations under 
an extradition agreement is to essentially ask the host Member State to disregard its treaty obligation.  
Extradition agreements generally leave ample grounds on which to refuse requests.  However, 
surrender to another EU Member State on the basis of an EAW is certainly not among these. As a 
consequence, the requested EU Member State will have to look for some other basis if it is to argue 
that treaty obligations are carried out in good faith.  
To complicate matters further, the 1957 European Convention on Extradition provides for a regime 
where the scope for refusal of requests has been gradually narrowed, precisely with a view to ensuring 
that the principal treaty obligation to extradite is better attained. Putting obligations under the 1957 
Convention at risk is certainly an undesirable consequence, and is the issue which lies at the heart of 
the BY case. It is this concern that prompted Advocate General Hogan to conclude his Opinion by 
asking the CJEU to rethink its decision in Petruhhin and to retreat in a dignified fashion before it is too 
late. 
